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Abstract  
Although macroeconomic news has a major impact on corporate earnings, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that financial analyst research is inefficient with respect to such news. Examining 
analysts’ earnings research, we find that they underreact to negative macroeconomic news. 
Analysts are not all equal though, as analysts employed at the same firm as an active 
macroeconomist underreact much less. We find that the benefit of analyst access to an 
economist is concentrated in firms that are high in cyclicality relative to their industry, high in 
cyclicality in general, and that are smaller in size. In addition, analysts who are exposed to 
more accurate or award-winning in-house macroeconomists benefit more. Investors appear to 
recognize the advantage of access to macroeconomists, reacting more strongly to these analysts’ 
forecast revisions. Overall, our results suggest that the presence of an active in-house 
macroeconomist improves the efficiency and credibility of analyst research. 
Keywords: Sell-side analyst, forecast optimism, macroeconomist, GDP, price efficiency. 
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G24. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although the state of the economy has a large impact on corporate earnings, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that analysts’ earnings forecasts are inefficient with respect to 
macroeconomic news, especially when economic growth declines (Goedhart, Raj, and Saxena 
2010; Schwartz and Dash 2011). However, anecdotes found in the financial press typically 
characterize analysts as a homogeneous group, ignoring the considerable variation in resources 
across research firms. In reality, of course, analysts do not produce research in isolation: they 
leverage in-house resources in a wide variety of forms (Bradshaw 2012).  
In a macroeconomic news setting, we conduct analyses to accomplish the following: (i) 
verify that analysts, in general, are inefficient with respect to negative news, (ii) examine if 
analysts improve their efficiency when they are employed at the same firm as an active 
macroeconomist, (iii) investigate the conditions under which economists are of greater help, 
and, (iv) reveal whether there is a payoff to investment firms for employing macroeconomists 
in terms of earnings research credibility.  
In our empirical implementation, we focus on quarterly earnings forecasts issued during 
1998 to 2011, and consider analysts’ efficiency in incorporating gross domestic product (GDP) 
news. We focus on GDP, since it is the most comprehensive indicator of macroeconomic 
activity (e.g., Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 2012; Konchitchki and Patatoukas 2014a), and 
it has a material impact on corporate earnings (e.g., Brown and Ball 1967; Gonedes 1973).  
While there are several potential GDP news measures available to financial analysts, we 
focus on a measure based on the most recent consensus GDP growth forecast. We find that 
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analysts underreact to negative but not to positive economic news, consistent with anecdotal 
evidence, as well as findings in recent work by Hann, Ogneva, and Sapriza (2012). This result 
holds after controlling for a variety of analyst, broker, and firm-level variables.  
Beyond documenting analysts’ underreaction to negative economic news, it is important 
to understand what underlies such behavior. There are two common, non-mutually exclusive 
reasons in the literature for why analysts might underreact to bad news. First, a significant part 
of analyst optimism is a carryover from coverage initiation (McNichols and O’Brien 1997; Das, 
Guo, and Zhang 2006). That is, analysts select to cover firms that they are optimistic about in 
the first place, since better-performing firms are more likely to produce trading commissions, 
access the capital markets, and acquire other firms. Analysts then maintain this positive outlook 
unless presented with convincing evidence to the contrary. Second, analysts are subject to 
conflicts of interest. Under this rationale, an analyst might knowingly ignore bad economic 
news in order to curry favor with management. While good relations with management can 
lead to a number of economic benefits, perhaps the most common benefit examined in the 
literature is maintaining or winning underwriting business (e.g., Dugar and Nathan 1995; Lin 
and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999; Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok 2007).  
Both explanations (analysts’ coverage of firms about which they are already optimistic 
and conflicts of interest) potentially explain why analysts would underreact to negative but not 
positive macroeconomic news. The primary difference is that the former explanation entertains 
the possibility of good faith, i.e., analysts maintain a positive outlook unless presented with 
credible counterevidence. In our setting, we argue that the presence of an active in-house 
macroeconomist can serve as a credible information source, especially relevant during 
economic downturns.  
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The key to such a benefit rests with the interaction between analysts and in-house 
macroeconomists, which can happen in a number of ways.1 First, in-house macroeconomists 
revise their research outlooks quite frequently, often on a daily basis, making timely economic 
updates available to analysts. Second, macroeconomists are able to add detail and nuance to 
GDP forecasts, helping analysts to discern the effects on specific industries and companies. 
Third, in-house macroeconomists are available for follow-up questions, and can provide 
additional context through morning conference calls, internal reports, and meetings. Fourth, 
economists often provide seminars and even teach courses in-house on understanding 
macroeconomic variables and forecasting. 
Finally, beyond mere macroeconomic expertise, economists provide an objectivity benefit. 
That is, analysts are highly dependent on management for much of their information (Brown, 
Call, Clement, and Sharp 2015). This interdependency can often result in analysts taking on 
managers’ optimistic mindsets. Economists, on the other hand, function at the aggregate level, 
and therefore do not have the same close relationship with managers. Consequently, not only 
do the economists have macroeconomic expertise, but they are likely to be more objective 
concerning how economic news affects specific companies.   
Our primary result is that analysts are more efficient in incorporating negative 
macroeconomic news when they are employed at the same firm as an active macroeconomist. 
                                                 
1  Our insights on analyst and macroeconomist interaction are based on discussions with macroeconomists, 
analysts, and Bloomberg representatives. One former analyst told us that she maintained a spreadsheet with GDP 
and other macro-level estimates linked to individual spreadsheets for each followed company. When the in-house 
macroeconomist updated his forecasts, she updated her central ‘macro’ spreadsheet which in turn flowed through 
to the individual company spreadsheets. As a benefit of having an in-house macroeconomist, she could ask follow-
up questions to better understand the GDP estimates, allowing greater insight as to effects on followed companies 
and industries.  
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In particular, analysts with access to an economist are able to incorporate roughly 15% more 
negative macroeconomic news into their earnings forecasts. In contrast, we do not find 
evidence of inefficiency due to underwriting conflicts. Thus, lack of exposure to 
macroeconomic expertise rather than a response to underwriting incentives appears to be the 
stronger determinant of analyst optimism in an adverse economic environment. 
We undertake a number of sensitivity analyses that provide additional insights and address 
potential endogeneity concerns. First, we show that our result is not due to firm or time effects 
by revealing similar results based on a firm-quarter relative measure of forecast error. Second, 
we demonstrate that the result is not sensitive to selective GDP forecast submission to 
Bloomberg by showing a comparable effect when only consistent GDP forecasters are included 
in the sample. Third, we conduct a placebo test which reveals that macroeconomists do not 
mitigate analyst inefficiency with respect to past accruals (e.g., Bradshaw, Richardson, and 
Sloan 2001). Fourth, we use two natural experiments to exploit changes in the availability of 
active macroeconomists to analysts to corroborate our results. Fifth, we show that firms with 
macroeconomists that were active in the past but not active currently do not mitigate analyst 
inefficiency, suggesting that exposure to timely economic expertise is a critical factor. Finally, 
we show that these effects are incremental to both broker resource main effects and interactions. 
In all instances, we achieve results consistent with our baseline results and in some instances 
stronger. 
In additional analysis, we explore the cross-sectional variation in our result. Such variation 
is important to examine, since it is plausible that access to economists will provide a greater 
benefit in some scenarios than in others. In firm-specific partitions, we show that the benefit of 
economists is concentrated in firms that are high in cyclicality in general, high in cyclicality 
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relative to their industry, and smaller in size. Examining variation in active economists, we 
reveal that access to more accurate and award-winning macroeconomists results in greater 
analyst forecast efficiency.  
Finally, although an in-house macroeconomist improves analyst research efficiency, it is 
not clear whether this increased efficiency translates to direct payoffs for the investment firms 
in terms of research credibility. Using several sample variations to address confounding events, 
we find that the market reacts about 13% more strongly to forecast revisions made by analysts 
linked to an active in-house macroeconomist.  
 Our findings make several contributions to the literature. First, in contrast to recent papers 
examining analyst inefficiency with respect to macroeconomic news (e.g., Basu, Markov, and 
Shivakumar 2010; Hann et al. 2012), we examine an important, potential mitigating factor—
exposure to timely economic expertise. Given that analysts’ forecasts are widely viewed as 
important benchmarks for firms' earnings performance (Kothari 2001), our findings suggest 
the possibility of locating a subset of analysts who are relatively more efficient, especially 
during economic downturns. 
Second, we add to recent work at the intersection of accounting and macroeconomics (e.g., 
Konchitchki 2011; Gallo, Hann, and Li 2013; Patatoukas 2014; Konchitchki and Patatoukas 
2014a, 2014b; Li, Richardson, and Tuna 2014). Although anecdotal evidence portrays analysts 
as inefficiently responding to changing economic conditions—particularly downturns, little 
formal evidence of this phenomenon exists. Using over 300,000 observations during the 1998 
to 2011 time period, we find that analysts underreact to negative GDP news. We overlap with 
Hann et al. (2012) and, to some extent, earlier work by Ackert and Hunter (1995) on this 
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baseline result; however, we depart significantly with our main focus, examining the role of in-
house macroeconomists in improving analyst earnings research.   
Third, we demonstrate that employing an active in-house macroeconomist leads to greater 
forecast efficiency, but it is not clear how investment firms benefit from this result per se. We 
shed light on one such benefit, providing evidence that employing an active in-house 
macroeconomist is also associated with greater earnings research credibility. Research 
credibility enhances an investment firm’s reputation and ability to provide research support to 
its clients, both of which are important determinants of their financial performance.  
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2 describes the data and key variables, 
and reports descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the main empirical results, and Section 4 
concludes. 
II. DATA SOURCES, SAMPLE SELECTION, AND KEY VARIABLES 
Data Sources 
Analyst earnings forecast data are obtained from the Thomson Reuters’ Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) US Detail file for the 1998 to 2011 period. Financial 
statement data are obtained from the Compustat quarterly database, and stock return data are 
obtained from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) daily stock return files. 
Information regarding the timing and underwriter of equity offering is obtained from Thomson 
Reuters’ Security Data Company (SDC) Platinum database.  
Bloomberg Data  
 Real GDP growth forecasts are obtained from the Bloomberg macroeconomic survey. To 
gain insight into this data source, we contacted economists who have participated in the 
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Bloomberg survey, as well as representatives from Bloomberg.2 Participants in the Bloomberg 
survey normally have advanced degrees in economics and are employed at investment banks, 
security firms, and universities. In earlier years, roughly 40 to 70 economists submitted GDP 
forecasts each month; in recent years, between 70 and 80 economists submit GDP forecasts 
each month. Economists are included in the Bloomberg survey either by invitation or by asking 
to participate. In the latter case, Bloomberg screens them to ensure they are from a credible 
investment firm or university. Although the economists are not paid directly for their forecasts, 
Bloomberg compensates them indirectly by providing them access to past survey data and 
name recognition for being associated with the survey.   
Sample Selection 
 Table 1 shows the sample selection procedure. While the Bloomberg macroeconomic 
survey data has become available since 1997, our sample period begins in 1998 as we require 
prior period data to measure macroeconomic news. We focus on analysts’ initial one-quarter-
ahead quarterly earnings forecasts occurring after the release of the prior quarter’s earnings 
announcement.3 Since the GDP forecasts used in our study are on a calendar-quarter basis, we 
retain firms reporting on a calendar-quarter basis (i.e., fiscal year-ends in March, June, 
                                                 
2 There are alternative economic forecast data sources, namely the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) 
conducted by Philadelphia Fed, and the Blue Chip Economic Indicators by Aspen Publishers. We consider the 
Bloomberg survey to be the most appropriate in our setting for the following reasons: (i) relative to SPF, 
Bloomberg is more timely (i.e., monthly versus quarterly for SPF), and provides the name and affiliation of each 
forecaster, and (ii) relative to Blue Chip, Bloomberg has more participants overall, and more participants 
associated with I/B/E/S brokers. 
 
3 Using analyst forecasts issued after prior earnings announcements not only ensures that the financial information 
and forecast error from last quarter are known but also alleviates the impact of stale forecasts. 
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September, or December) to synchronize GDP and analysts’ earnings forecasts. In addition, we 
require that the first macroeconomic survey for the quarter is available to ensure that analysts 
have access to the current macroeconomic forecasts.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Key Variables 
Primary Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in our main analyses is the signed analyst forecast error, FE, 
defined as actual EPS minus the analyst earnings forecast, scaled by the price at the beginning 
of the quarter. Accordingly, a negative analyst forecast error indicates analyst optimism, 
whereas a positive analyst forecast error indicates analyst pessimism.  
Macroeconomic News Variable 
As a macroeconomic news proxy, we use the current quarter news, NEWSt, defined as the 
consensus real GDP growth forecast for quarter t minus the actual real GDP growth for quarter 
t-4. In untabulated tests, we evaluate several alternative news measures that are within analysts’ 
feasible information set, including those based on both prior GDP growth realizations and 
forward-looking consensus GDP forecasts. Overall, we find that our contemporaneous news 
measure, NEWSt, has the strongest association with current earnings, and, more importantly, 
that it is the only news measure that is associated with analyst forecast errors.  
Macroeconomist Variables 
We are interested in whether or not access to an active in-house macroeconomist can 
improve analyst efficiency with respect to macroeconomic news. We measure the economist 
variable, MACRO, with an indicator set to 1 if the in-house economist’s GDP forecast is 
included in the most recent Bloomberg macroeconomic survey, and 0 otherwise.  
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Within the set of active economists, we proxy for the quality of their expertise with both 
their GDP forecast accuracy and Institutional Investor award status. Specifically, we measure 
GDP forecast accuracy, MACRO_ACCURACY, by the economist’s absolute GDP forecast 
error in the most recent survey, scaled by the absolute median consensus GDP forecast error, 
and then multiplied by (-1), so that a higher value of the variable means greater accuracy. As 
accuracy is not the only determinant of high quality economic research (Lamont 1995), we also 
measure the quality of research with the economist’s award status during the year, 
MACRO_AWARD, which is an indicator variable set to 1 if the economist is ranked in the top 
three or as a runner-up by the Institutional Investor magazine, and 0 otherwise.4  
Equity Underwriting Variables 
An additional set of variables is related to analysts’ equity underwriting incentives. The 
indicator variable EQ_AFFIL represents the existing underwriter-client relationship, which is 
set to 1 if an investment firm acts as the lead manager or co-manager of the firm’s equity 
underwriting team in the year prior to its analyst's earnings forecast for the firm, and 0 
otherwise (Lin and McNichols 1998). The indicator variable EQ_OPPORT represents a 
potential future equity underwriting opportunity and is set to 1 if a firm announces an equity 
offering in the year following an analyst's earnings forecast for the firm, and 0 otherwise (Feng 
and McVay 2010). 
                                                 
4 Institutional Investor announces the economist awards along with the other awards in the October issue each 
year. In our setting, we wish to proxy for better quality research underlying the award; therefore, we set 
MACRO_AWARD = 1 for the year leading up to the economist's award. For example, if economist i receives the 
award in the October 2001 issue, we set MACRO_AWARD = 1 for the period Nov. 2000 - Oct. 2001. The 
MACRO_AWARD indicator is set to 1 in the same fashion for other years in which she/he were a winner, and set 
to 0 for any non-winning years. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our study. In Panel A, 
focusing on the key variables in our study, we find that the mean price-deflated analyst forecast 
error (FE) is optimistic for both bad and good news samples. We report that 27.9% (30.1%) of 
earnings forecasts in the negative (positive) macroeconomic news sample are supplied by 
analysts who have access to in-house macroeconomist’s research, 3.8% (4.4%) of earnings 
forecasts are supplied by analysts with existing equity underwriter-client relationship, and 6.4% 
(5.3%) of earnings forecasts are issued by analysts in the year prior to a firm’s SEO 
announcement. 
In Panel B, the number of observations available for the short-window market response 
tests is reduced due to the calculation of price-deflated analyst forecast revisions, REV, which 
require a benchmark earnings expectation (i.e., consensus analyst forecast within [-30,-2]). The 
mean and median revisions are depressed due to the price-deflation; however, in untabulated 
tests, we find that the mean REV is significantly different from zero for both bad and good 
news samples, and the mean REV is significantly less for the bad news sample than for the 
good news sample. The mean (median) market capitalization for our sample is approximately 
$11 ($3) billion. Since the distribution of firm size is skewed, we use the natural logarithm of 
firm size to control for firm size in our short-window market reaction tests. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 In this section, we present our main empirical results. First, we examine the link between 
observable GDP news and firm earnings. Next, we examine analyst efficiency with respect to 
macroeconomic news, and whether the availability of in-house macroeconomists’ research is 
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associated with analyst forecast efficiency. We then examine firm and economist-specific 
factors that influence the economic impact of an in-house macroeconomist. Last, we investigate 
whether there is evidence of an economic payoff to an investment firm’s economic 
sophistication in terms of research credibility. 
Link between Observable GDP News and Firm Earnings 
Implicit in this study’s motivation is the existence of a meaningful link between 
observable GDP news and firm earnings. Thus, before presenting our main results, we verify 
the association between GDP news and corporate earnings.  
Table 3 presents R2 descriptives from estimating firm-specific OLS regressions of 
earnings changes on GDP news for sample firms during the 1998 to 2011 period. Earnings 
changes are seasonally adjusted changes in earnings, calculated as income before extraordinary 
items for quarter t minus income before extraordinary items for quarter t-4, scaled by average 
total assets for quarter t. Current quarter observable GDP news, NEWSt, is defined as the most 
recent consensus real GDP growth forecast for quarter t minus the actual real GDP growth for 
quarter t-4. Industries are based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification.  
 We find the mean of individual firm R2s to be 0.114 and 0.201 in the negative and positive 
GDP news samples, respectively. Examining the heterogeneity across industries, we find that 
the weakest association across samples is Utilities (mean R2s of 0.064 and 0.119 in the negative 
and positive news samples, respectively), while the strongest is Consumer Durables (mean R2s 
of 0.164 and 0.303 in the negative and positive news samples, respectively). These findings 
support our assumption that observable GDP news is consistently associated with quarterly 
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firm earnings across industries. The findings also highlight the inter-industry variation in 
cyclicality. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Analyst Efficiency with Respect to Macroeconomic News 
Model Specification 
 We examine analyst efficiency with respect to macroeconomic news by regressing the 
forecast error, FE, on the macroeconomic news variable, NEWS, and control variables. To 
ensure that the inferences derived from the empirical tests are not specific to our definition of 
current quarter macroeconomic news, we also evaluate the following two measures: (i) the 
most recent consensus real GDP growth forecast for the quarter minus the final consensus real 
GDP growth forecast for the same quarter last year (i.e., FGDPt - FGDPt-4), and (ii) the actual 
real GDP growth for the quarter minus the actual real GDP growth for the same quarter last 
year (i.e., GDPt - GDPt-4), respectively.  
There are three classes of controls that are relevant to our setting. First, there are analyst-
specific variables that are known to be associated with forecast error, including forecast horizon, 
HORIZON, forecast frequency, FREQ, the number of industries covered, NIND, number of 
firms covered, NFIRM, firm-specific experience, FEXP, and the analyst’s prior forecast error, 
LAG_FE (e.g., Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 1997; Clement 1999; Jacob, Lys, and Neale 1999). 
Second, investment firm resources have been shown to affect the quality of analyst 
research. To capture those effects, we use investment firm size, BSIZE, a categorical measure 
of investment firm size, TOP_BROKER, and the magnitude of underwriting activity, 
UW_RANK. Finally, our controls for firm-specific variables likely to affect the forecast error 
include total accruals, LAG_TACC, prior abnormal buy-and-hold returns, PRIOR_BHR, and 
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earnings sensitivity to macroeconomic news, CYCLICALITY (e.g., Bradshaw et al. 2001; 
Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 2003; Hutton, Lee, and Shu 2012).  
Based on the preceding discussion, we specify the following OLS regression model, 
where indexes for analyst, firm, and quarter are omitted for brevity: 
 FE  = α0 + α1 ∙ NEWS + Analyst Controls + Broker Controls + Firm Controls  
  + Industry Effects + Year Effects + 1 
(1) 
The variables in this model are defined as follows. 
FE Forecast error, calculated as firm j's actual EPS for quarter t 
minus analyst i’s earnings forecast for firm j in quarter t, scaled 
by the stock price at the beginning of quarter t. 
NEWS Macroeconomic news, defined as the most recent median 
consensus real GDP growth forecast for quarter t available at the 
time of analyst i's earnings forecast for firm j in quarter t, minus 
the actual real GDP growth for quarter t-4.  
Analyst-specific controls: 
HORIZON Forecast horizon, defined as the natural logarithm of the days 
between analyst i's earnings forecast for firm j in quarter t and 
firm j’s earnings announcement for quarter t. 
FREQ Forecast frequency, defined as the number of earnings forecasts 
issued by analyst i for firm j in quarter t. 
NIND Number of Fama-French 48 industries that analyst i follows in 
quarter t. 
NFIRM Number of firms that analyst i follows in quarter t. 
FEXP Firm-specific experience, defined as the number of quarters that 
analyst i has issued at least one earnings forecast for firm j prior 
to quarter t. 
LAG_FE Lagged analyst forecast error, calculated as firm j's actual EPS 
for quarter t-1 minus analyst i’s last earnings forecast for firm j 
in quarter t-1, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of 
quarter t-1. 
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Broker-specific controls: 
BSIZE 
 
Investment firm size, calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
number of unique analysts employed by analyst i’s investment 
firm in quarter t. 
TOP_BROKER An indicator that is set to 1 if analyst i’s investment firm size is 
within top 10% in a given calendar year, and 0 otherwise. 
UW_RANK Investment firm’s underwriting rank, measured by the percentile 
rank of total equity underwriting dollar amounts of analyst i’s 
investment firm in the year prior to analyst i's earnings forecast 
for firm j in quarter t. 
Firm-specific controls: 
LAG_TACC Lagged total accruals, calculated as firm j’s income before 
extraordinary items minus total cash flow from operations in 
quarter t-1, scaled by average total assets of quarter t-1.  
PRIOR_BHR Prior abnormal buy-and-hold return, defined as the size-
adjusted abnormal buy-and-hold return for firm j within [-90,-
2] of analyst i's earnings forecast for firm j in quarter t. 
CYCLICALITY Earnings sensitivity to GDP news, measured as the R2 from the 
regression of the firm’s seasonal change in quarterly earnings 
on the corresponding quarterly GDP news over the sample 
period. 
Industry Effects Industry indicator variables based on the Fama-French 48 
industry group classification. 
Year Effects Year indicator variables. 
1 Error term. 
 Based on our definition of analyst forecast error, FE, a negative (positive) FE indicates 
analyst optimism (pessimism). Since the macroeconomic news variable is signed, a negative 
coefficient estimate on NEWS, α1, indicates analyst overreaction to macroeconomic news, 
either negative or positive. By contrast, a positive coefficient estimate on NEWS, α1, indicates 
analyst underreaction to macroeconomic news, either negative or positive. For example, both 
analyst underreaction to negative news (i.e., positive α1 times negative NEWS) and 
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overreaction to positive news (i.e., negative α1 times positive NEWS) would increase analyst 
optimism (i.e., result in a more negative forecast error). The following table summarizes signs 
and interpretations of coefficient estimates on the macroeconomic news variable.  
 
Potential coefficient estimates on NEWS, α1, and interpretation of estimates: 
Analyst response: Negative macro news:  Positive macro news: 
Underreact to news α1 > 0  
(i.e., analysts are too optimistic) 
α1 > 0 
(i.e., analysts are too pessimistic) 
Overreact to news α1 < 0 
(i.e., analysts are too pessimistic) 
α1 < 0 
(i.e., analysts are too optimistic) 
 
Both anecdotal evidence (Goedhart et al. 2010; Schwartz and Dash 2011) and empirical 
evidence (Hong and Stein 1999; Hong, Lim, and Stein 2000) suggest that analysts, on average, 
do not fully incorporate bad news into their earnings forecasts. Therefore, we expect analysts 
to underreact to negative macroeconomic news, resulting in forecasts that are too optimistic 
(i.e., α1 > 0 for the negative news sample). 
Multivariate Results 
Table 4 reports the results of OLS regressions of Eq. (1). For all regressions in this study, 
continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%, and the t-statistics reported in 
parentheses are clustered by firm and quarter to address cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence (Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor 2010).5 We find that the coefficient estimate on 
NEWS is positive and significant across the negative news samples and is not significantly 
                                                 
5 For the market reaction tests, standard errors are clustered by firm and day; the statistical significance is stronger 
when clustered by firm and quarter. We also evaluate the results with clustering by analyst and quarter; the results 
across all tables remain statistically significant at the p < 10% level or better. 
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different from zero in the positive news samples, regardless of the NEWS measure used. These 
estimates suggest that individual analysts underreact to negative macroeconomic news but fully 
incorporate positive macroeconomic news.6  In economic terms, a one standard deviation 
increase in negative GDP news results in an expected $0.04 increase in forecast error, which is 
approximately 15% of the median firm EPS of $0.27 in the corresponding negative GDP news 
sample.7 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Based on these results, in untabulated analyses, we examine the question of whether 
analysts' forecast revisions are related to GDP news. We note that for the positive news sample, 
it is likely to be true given the absence of an association between the news variable and the 
forecast error. However, the negative news sample result is an empirical question. When we 
regress analyst forecast revisions, (defined as the forecast for quarter t minus the actual earnings 
for quarter t-4 and then scaled by price), on negative and positive economic news and control 
variables per Table 4, we observe positive and significant coefficient estimates on the NEWS 
variable in both the negative and positive samples. Thus, the results indicate that while analyst 
                                                 
6 To ensure that the relation between FE and NEWS is not influenced by any bias in the macro-consensus forecast 
(from which the NEWS variable is constructed), we take two measures. First, we replace the forecast with the 
GDP realization in Columns 5 and 6, showing similar results. Second, we modify Eq. (1) to include the unsigned 
macro-consensus forecast error, GDP_FE, and interact this variable with NEWS. The coefficient estimate on 
NEWS * GDP_FE is not significant in any of our specifications, indicating that the relation between FE and 
NEWS is not influenced by the macro-consensus forecast error.  
 
7 A one standard deviation increase in bad NEWS (2.02%) * coefficient estimate from Table 4 (0.0731) = 0.15% 
increase in the price-deflated forecast error. Based on the median beginning price in the bad news sample ($24.4), 
the increase in forecast error is approximately $24.4 * 0.15% = $0.04. 
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revisions are related to both negative and positive news, their forecast revisions are incomplete 
with respect to negative news. 
Given that individual analysts are inefficient only with respect to negative macroeconomic 
news, we focus our subsequent analyses and discussions on the negative news sample. In 
addition, for brevity, we include but do not tabulate the results of the analyst, broker, and firm 
controls in the subsequent analyses.  
In-House Macroeconomists and Analyst Forecast Efficiency 
Model Specification 
After observing analysts’ underreaction to negative macroeconomic news, we turn our 
attention to what causes the inefficiency. One reason for analyst research optimism is that 
analysts normally initiate coverage with optimistic research (McNichols and O’Brien 1997; 
Das et al. 2006), and, without convincing evidence to the contrary, analysts persist in this 
positive outlook. With respect to bad economic news, we use an active in-house 
macroeconomist as a potential source of “evidence to the contrary.” A second reason put forth 
for analyst optimism is conflicts of interest related to underwriting incentives (e.g., Dugar and 
Nathan 1995; Lin and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999). To investigate these 
non-mutually exclusive explanations, we specify the following OLS regression model: 
FE  = β0 + β1 ∙ NEWS + β2 ∙ MACRO + β3 ∙ MACRO * NEWS + β4 ∙ EQ_AFFIL  
  + β5 ∙ EQ_AFFIL * NEWS + β6 ∙ EQ_OPPORT  
  + β7 ∙ EQ_OPPORT * NEWS + Analyst Controls + Broker Controls  
  + Firm Controls + Industry Effects + Year Effects + 2 
(2) 
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The variables not previously defined are as follows. 
MACRO Availability of an active in-house macroeconomist, an indicator 
variable that is set to 1 if the real GDP growth forecast for quarter 
t, made by the economist employed by analyst i's investment 
firm, is included in the Bloomberg survey most recent to analyst 
i's earnings forecast for firm j in quarter t, and 0 otherwise. 
EQ_AFFIL Equity underwriter-client relationship, an indicator variable that 
is set to 1 if analyst i is employed by the investment firm that 
acted as the lead manager or co-manager of firm j's equity 
underwriting team in the year prior to analyst i's earnings 
forecast for firm j in quarter t, and 0 otherwise. 
EQ_OPPORT Equity underwriting opportunity, an indicator variable that is set 
to 1 if firm j announces an equity offering in the year following 
analyst i's earnings forecast for firm j in quarter t, and 0 
otherwise. 
2 Error term. 
If analyst inefficiency with respect to negative macroeconomic news can be at least partly 
attributed to the lack of access to an active in-house macroeconomist, we expect the estimate 
of β3 to be negative, indicating that analysts with access underreact less to negative 
macroeconomic news. Similarly, if part of analyst inefficiency with respect to negative 
macroeconomic news stems from their equity underwriting incentives, we expect the estimates 
of either or both β5 and β7 to be positive, meaning that analysts underreact more to negative 
macroeconomic news in the presence of such economic incentives. 
Multivariate Results 
In Panel A of Table 5, we provide some descriptives on research firms that employ an 
active macroeconomist versus those that do not. Although most differences are statistically 
significant, only a few appear economically meaningful. In particular, analysts at firms with 
access to a macroeconomist tend to forecast more frequently, cover more firms, and have 
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greater firm-specific forecasting experience. In addition, research firms with active 
macroeconomists are significantly larger, emphasizing the need to evaluate broker resources as 
an alternative explanation.   
Panel B of Table 5 reports the results based on Eq. (2). Focusing on the full sample in 
column 1, we find a significant estimate on the macroeconomic news variable, NEWS (β1 = 
0.0772, p < 0.01). Germane to our conjecture, we find the estimate on MACRO * NEWS to be 
negative and significant (β3 = -0.0117, p < 0.05). This evidence suggests that analysts 
underreact less to negative macroeconomic news in the presence of an active in-house 
macroeconomist. Specifically, when analysts have access to an in-house macroeconomist, on 
average, they incorporate approximately 15% (= 0.0117 ÷ 0.0772) more negative 
macroeconomic news into their earnings forecasts.  
Regarding analysts’ equity underwriting incentives, we find no evidence that analysts’ 
underreaction to negative macroeconomic news is driven by existing, EQ_AFFIL, or future 
equity underwriting opportunities, EQ_OPPORT.  
Sensitivity Results 
Within Table 5, Panel B, we address the following potential concerns with our results: (i) 
firm-quarter effects on the forecast error (column 2), (ii) selectively submitted GDP forecasts 
(column 3), and (iii) broker resources as alternative explanations (columns 4 - 8).  
In column 2, we provide an alternative approach commonly used in the literature to control 
for firm-quarter effects when evaluating analyst forecasting performance (e.g., Clement 1999; 
Jacob et al. 1999; Lim 2001; Clement and Tse 2003). This method calculates each analyst’s 
firm-quarter dependent and independent variables relative to that of all analysts forecasting for 
the same firm-quarter. For example, the relative version of the dependent variable FE is equal 
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to analyst i’s forecast error for firm j in quarter t minus the mean FE for all analysts following 
firm j in quarter t. The analyst and broker independent variables are calculated in the same 
fashion, and, of course, the firm, industry, and time effects drop out of this model specification. 
Results based on this relative forecast error measure are consistent with those based on the 
signed absolute forecast error variable. 
In column 3, we evaluate the possible influence of selectively submitted forecasts. Due to 
the nature of the Bloomberg data, it is possible that in-house macroeconomists may submit 
their GDP forecasts to Bloomberg only at certain times, e.g., when they are more confident in 
their forecast accuracy. As a result, our MACRO measure may simply capture quarters for 
which there are better GDP forecasts, rather than active macroeconomists in general. To 
address this issue, we conduct a test aimed at excluding macroeconomists who may ‘jump in 
and out’ of the survey. In particular, we restrict the sample to economists who submit to 
Bloomberg consistently, defined as those who submit forecasts in each of the four consecutive 
quarters preceding the same-firm’s analyst earnings forecast.8 The results provide two insights. 
First, the sample size does not drop very much, indicating that forecast submission to 
Bloomberg is fairly stable. Second, as a result of the first point, these findings are very similar 
in economic magnitude and significance to those based on the full sample.  
In columns 4 - 8, we conduct several tests to evaluate broker resources as an alternative 
explanation. If the MACRO variable captures greater broker resources or expertise in general 
and not macroeconomic expertise in particular, then this variable may reduce the forecast error 
                                                 
8 In an untabulated analysis, we find similar results if we also define consistent economists as those who submit 
forecasts in the 12 consecutive months preceding the same-firm’s analyst earnings forecast. 
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for other inefficiencies as well. One candidate for a placebo test is the lagged total accruals 
since prior research has shown analyst inefficiency with respect to accruals (Bradshaw et al. 
2001). In this setting, macroeconomic expertise is not likely to be helpful in understanding past 
firm-specific accruals, whereas general expertise may be helpful. 9  Consistent with prior 
literature, column 4 reveals that analysts are inefficient with respect to past accruals (here, 
LAG_TACC is multiplied by -1, to render an interpretation consistent with the negative NEWS 
variable); however, the presence of an active macroeconomist does not mitigate this 
inefficiency.  
In columns 5 and 6, we use two natural experiments to examine the effect of changes in 
analysts and changes in active economists at banks. In column 5, we identify when an analyst 
moves from an investment firm without an active macroeconomist to a firm with an active in-
house macroeconomist (here, a change to macroeconomist availability), as well as the opposite 
scenario, when an analyst moves from a firm with an active in-house macroeconomist to a firm 
without an active macroeconomist (here, a change away from macroeconomist availability). 
We then compare the earnings forecasts issued by the same analyst for the same set of firms 
one year before and one year after the year of the change. The slope estimate on the NEWS 
term captures analysts without macroeconomist availability, and the incremental slope on the 
MACRO * NEWS interaction represents the additional effect of the same analysts with 
macroeconomist availability. We find that the same analysts underreact to negative 
macroeconomic news when they are without macroeconomist availability, and that their 
                                                 
9 Of course, certain anomalies may continue to prevail despite a high level of broker resources and expertise; 
therefore, the results of this test should be interpreted cautiously and not be taken as conclusive evidence against 
the resources alternative explanation. 
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forecast efficiency improves significantly when they have access to an active in-house 
macroeconomist. Since this change in analyst forecast efficiency occurs around analyst 
turnover within a relatively short window, the improved forecast efficiency is unlikely to reflect 
unmodeled analyst characteristics. 
In column 6, we address a similar concern related to unmodeled broker-specific variables. 
We identify when an investment firm changes from not having an active in-house 
macroeconomist to having one, as well as the opposite scenario, when the firm changes from 
having an active in-house macroeconomist to not having one. We then compare the earnings 
forecasts issued by analysts forecasting for the same firms one year before and one year after 
the year of change in availability. We find that analysts underreact to negative macroeconomic 
news when their investment firm does not have an active in-house macroeconomist, and that 
their forecast efficiency improves significantly when the investment firm has an active 
macroeconomist. Overall, the results from these two experiments indicate that the results are 
unlikely to reflect the presence of either unmodeled analyst or broker variables.  
In column 7, we examine the effect of “inactive” macroeconomists. In particular, brokers 
with inactive economists have the resources to employ macroeconomists; however, these 
economists are less likely to be up to speed on current GDP. We modify the specification to 
include an INACTIVE indicator and an INACTIVE * NEWS interaction. In this specification, 
INACTIVE is defined as a macroeconomist who did not issue a GDP forecast for quarter t, but 
did issue a GDP forecast for at least one quarter prior to quarter t.  As can be seen, the inactive 
macroeconomists do not improve the analysts' forecast errors.10 Based on our conversations 
                                                 
10 We also implement a more restrictive definition of inactive macroeconomists whereby we include only analysts’ 
forecast observations that fall in between economist i’s first and last GDP forecast at broker j. The objective of 
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with economists and analysts, we believe that, since these economists are not forecasting GDP 
currently, they are unable to aid analysts to the same degree that the more active economists 
can. 
Finally, in column 8, we provide interactions with broker resource variables. Although the 
main effects of broker resource variables are included in all models, we include both the main 
effects (suppressed), as well as the interactions between resources and the NEWS variable. The 
result on the interaction of interest, MACRO * NEWS, remains significant, and even becomes 
slightly stronger in terms of the parameter estimate magnitude and significance.   
In sum, our findings in Table 5 suggest that analysts’ underreaction to negative 
macroeconomic news is due, at least in part, to their lack of access to macroeconomic expertise, 
and that broker resources in general are not likely to be an alternative explanation.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Cross-Sectional Factors Affecting the Benefit of Access to a Macroeconomist 
Model Specification 
Thus far, we find that the availability of an active in-house macroeconomist is positively 
associated with analyst forecast efficiency in the negative macroeconomic news environment. 
However, it is not likely that macroeconomists provide the same benefit in all circumstances. 
In this section, we examine the effects of cyclicality and firm size on the benefit provided by 
the economists.   
                                                 
this constraint is to capture the economists who we are reasonably certain remain at the broker but do not have a 
current quarter GDP forecast. This more restrictive definition provides results that are inferentially similar. 
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While economists should have greater potential to help analysts following more cyclical 
firms (Hann et al. 2012), the relationship with firm size is less certain. On one hand, larger 
firms’ earnings may be tied to a greater extent to the macroeconomy, providing a larger 
potential benefit of access to a macroeconomist. On the other hand, firm size may also capture 
broker revenue incentives (Hann et al. 2012). If true, then analysts may resist the advice of 
economists for firms that are larger in a negative news environment. In addition, forecast errors 
may simply be smaller for larger firms due to their richer information environments (e.g., Lim 
2001; Zhang 2008), creating less potential for improvement via the economist's input.  
We proxy for cyclicality, CYCLICALITY, with the R2 from the regression of the firm’s 
seasonal change in quarterly earnings on the corresponding quarterly GDP news over the 
sample period. In addition to comparing cyclicality among all firms, we also make this 
comparison within-industry, where each firm is ranked based on CYCLICALITY within its 
relevant Fama-French 12 industry category. Finally, we measure firm size, SIZE, as previously 
defined. To simplify the interpretation, we partition samples across the three cross-sectional 
variables of interest into high and low samples based on median splits.  
Multivariate Results 
Table 6 reports the results based on the sample partitions. We find the estimate on 
MACRO * NEWS to be negative and significant only in the top half of each partition based on 
general cyclicality and within-industry cyclicality.11 We also find the estimate to be negative 
                                                 
11 To examine if these results are sensitive to our measure of cyclicality, we create the following two alternative 
measures: (i) ‘GDP-sales beta’ which is the slope coefficient from a firm-specific time-series regression of 
quarterly firm-specific sales growth on quarterly growth in GDP (Jones and Tuzel 2013), and (ii) ‘GDP-earnings 
beta’ where the only difference is that we use firm-specific earnings growth in place of sales growth. Untabulated 
results reveal that both of these measures yield inferences similar to those of the original measure.  
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and significant only for the bottom half of the firm size partition. This evidence suggests that 
the benefit of economists is concentrated in firms that are high in cyclicality in general, high in 
cyclicality relative to their industry, and firms that are smaller in size.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Examining Variation in Macroeconomist Expertise  
Model Specification 
It is not likely that all active macroeconomists provide the same benefit to analysts. 
Specifically, we posit that analyst exposure to higher-quality macroeconomists may result in 
greater improvement to forecast efficiency.  
We proxy for macroeconomists’ expertise by their GDP forecast accuracy, as well as their 
All-American Research Team award status. Regarding award status, each year, the Institutional 
Investor magazine polls institutional investors to determine the top Wall Street 
macroeconomists. Anecdotally, regarding Ed Hyman, an award-winning economist at ISI 
Group, buy-side clients remarked that they value his industry surveys of staffing companies 
and manufacturers which provide “a timely read on business sentiments” (Institutional Investor 
2011). Assuming such economic insights are also impactful internally, award-winning 
macroeconomists should lead to incremental improvements in their analysts’ forecast efficiency. 
In these tests, we evaluate variation within the set of active macroeconomists (all MACRO 
variables = 1), and replace MACRO in Eq. (2) with the economist-specific variables, and their 
interactions with NEWS. Retaining all control variables from the prior models leads to the 
following specification.  
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 FE  = γ0 + γ1 ∙ NEWS + γ2 ∙ MACRO_ACCURACY  
  + γ3 ∙ MACRO_ACCURACY * NEWS + γ4 ∙ MACRO_AWARD  
  + γ5 ∙ MACRO_AWARD * NEWS + γ6 ∙ EQ_AFFIL  
  + γ7 ∙ EQ_AFFIL * NEWS + γ8 ∙ EQ_OPPORT  
  + γ9 ∙ EQ_OPPORT * NEWS + Analyst Controls + Broker Controls  
  + Firm Controls + Industry Effects + Year Effects + 3 
(3) 
The variables not previously defined are as follows. 
MACRO_ 
ACCURACY 
In-house macroeconomist’s forecast accuracy, calculated as 
the economist’s absolute GDP forecast error in the most 
recent research, scaled by the absolute median consensus 
GDP forecast error, and then multiplied by (-1). 
MACRO_ 
AWARD 
In-house macroeconomist’s All-American Research Team 
award status, an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the 
economist employed by analyst i’s investment firm is ranked 
in the top three or as a runner-up by Institutional Investor 
during the year, and 0 otherwise. 
3 Error term. 
Regarding economist-specific variables, we expect analysts’ efficiency in incorporating 
negative macroeconomic news to be positively associated with both the accuracy and the award 
status of their in-house macroeconomists. Specifically, we expect the γ3 and γ5 estimates to be 
negative for the interactions of these two economist-specific variables with NEWS.  
Multivariate Results 
Table 7 reports the results based on Eq. (3). Focusing on the full model in column 3, we 
find a negative and significant coefficient estimate on the MACRO_ACCURACY interaction 
(γ3 = -0.0086, p < 0.05), and a negative and significant estimate on the MACRO_AWARD 
interaction (γ5 = -0.0190, p < 0.01), respectively suggesting that more accurate and higher-
quality in-house macroeconomists improve analyst efficiency to a greater extent. Specifically, 
a one standard deviation increase in MACRO_ACCURACY in negative macroeconomic news 
quarters is associated with a 16% increase in analyst efficiency with respect to negative 
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macroeconomic news (= 1.13% * 0.0086 ÷ 0.0610). Similarly, if an in-house macroeconomist 
receives the All-American Research Team award from Institutional Investor, the analysts at the 
same firm, on average, incorporate approximately 31% (= 0.0190 ÷ 0.0610) more negative 
macroeconomic news into their earnings forecasts. 
To summarize, our findings in Table 7 suggest that the benefits of access to an active in-
house macroeconomist vary with the quality of the in-house macroeconomist’s research. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
In-House Macroeconomists and Research Credibility 
Model Specification 
If analysts with access to in-house macroeconomists’ research are more efficient in 
incorporating negative macroeconomic news, their forecasts should be more accurate and 
hence more informative to investors (e.g., Park and Stice 2000; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 
2004; Chen, Francis, and Jiang 2005). However, it has also been shown that investors often fail 
to weight or underweight accuracy-related cues (e.g., Gleason and Lee 2003; Clement and Tse 
2003; Bonner, Hugon, and Walther 2007). 
Whether investors reward access to a macroeconomist with enhanced earnings research 
credibility is ultimately an empirical question; however, there are several reasons to believe 
that investors may do so. First, active macroeconomists regularly appear on internet forums, 
television, radio, and are quoted by wire services. Second, macroeconomists frequently make 
presentations to institutional clients, government entities, and individual investors. One 
macroeconomist we spoke to said he had visited over 40 countries to give presentations to 
professional investors and institutions; similarly, another economist recalled making over 100 
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presentations in just one year. Third, many macroeconomists write economic outlook updates 
every day which are distributed externally to current and prospective clients.  
Empirically, we examine the question of research credibility with the following model:  
CAR  = θ0 + θ1 ∙ REV + θ2 ∙ MACRO + θ3 ∙ MACRO * REV + θ4 ∙ PRIOR_ACC 
  + θ5 ∙ PRIOR_ACC * REV + θ6 ∙SIZE + θ7 ∙ SIZE * REV + θ8 ∙ BM  
  + θ9 ∙ BM * REV + θ10 ∙ BETA + θ11 ∙ BETA * REV  
  + Analyst Controls + Analyst Controls * REV + Broker Controls  
  + Broker Controls * REV + Firm Controls + Firm Controls * REV  
  + Industry Effects + Year Effects + 4 
(4) 
The variables not previously defined are as follows.  
CAR Three-day cumulative size-adjusted abnormal return 
surrounding analyst i's earnings forecast for firm j in quarter t. 
REV Analyst forecast revision, defined as analyst i’s earnings 
forecast for firm j in quarter t minus the most recent mean 
consensus forecast (within [-30,-2]), scaled by the stock price 
at the beginning of quarter t. 
PRIOR_ACC Analyst prior accuracy, calculated as the average of analyst i’s 
price-deflated absolute forecast errors over the prior four 
quarters multiplied by -1, so that the variable is increasing in 
accuracy. 
BM Book-to-market ratio of firm j at the beginning of quarter t. 
BETA Market beta, defined as firm j's market beta in the calendar 
year preceding analyst i's earnings forecast for firm j in quarter 
t. 
4 Error term. 
To address the impact of confounding information events within the return window, we 
consider four different sample selection criteria: (1) all forecasts from our primary sample (i.e., 
no restrictions other than the availability of short-window returns, forecast revision, and control 
variables), (2) all forecasts excluding those issued within the event window of an earnings 
announcement, (3) all forecasts excluding those issued within the event window of 
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management guidance, and (4) all forecasts excluding those issued within the event window of 
either earnings announcement or management guidance. 
The coefficient estimate θ1 is expected to be positive given prior research that finds the 
analyst forecast revision is informative to the market (e.g., Givoly and Lakonishok 1979; 
Frankel, Kothari, and Weber 2006). If the greater forecast efficiency with respect to negative 
macroeconomic news enhances the credibility of analyst research, we expect the θ3 estimate to 
be positive, indicating that there is an incremental market reaction for analysts who have access 
to an active in-house macroeconomist.  
Multivariate Results 
Table 8 reports that the coefficient estimate on REV is positive and significant (θ1 = 4.5916, 
p < 0.01). More importantly, we find the estimate on the interaction of interest, MACRO * 
REV, to be positive and significant (θ3 = 0.5953, p < 0.01), suggesting that investors consider 
the forecasts issued by analysts with access to in-house macroeconomists’ research more 
credible. Specifically, the market reaction is approximately 13% (= 0.5953 ÷ 4.5916) greater 
for analysts with access to in-house macroeconomists’ research.  
In sum, the market seems to attribute greater credibility to analysts with access to in-house 
macroeconomists during negative macroeconomic news periods. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that financial analysts are too optimistic during economic 
downturns. Consistent with this assertion, we demonstrate that analysts underreact to negative 
macroeconomic news, but not to positive news. In terms of mitigating this inefficiency, we find 
that analysts appear to benefit from the availability of an active in-house macroeconomist. This 
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benefit is concentrated in firms that are high in cyclicality relative to their industry, high in 
cyclicality in general, and that are smaller in size. Moreover, we find that analysts realize 
greater forecasting benefits in the presence of more accurate or award-winning in-house 
macroeconomists. Finally, examining the impact of in-house macroeconomists on market 
prices, we find that investors act as if they recognize this benefit to analysts’ forecast efficiency. 
That is, they react more strongly to earnings research from analysts who have access to in-
house macroeconomists.   
These findings make several contributions to the literature. First, while prior literature on 
analyst efficiency almost exclusively focuses on firm-level information, our paper investigates 
analyst efficiency with respect to an important determinant of corporate earnings, 
macroeconomic news. Second, within a macroeconomic news setting, we document the benefit 
of an in-house macroeconomist for analyst earnings research. Given that analyst forecasts are 
important benchmarks of a firm’s financial performance, our findings suggest the possibility 
of identifying analysts who are relatively more sensitive to macroeconomic changes. Finally, 
our findings suggest that in-house macroeconomists not only play an important role in analysts’ 
forecast efficiency, but also influence the market credibility of analyst research.   
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
 
Sample Selection Criteria 
Firm-
Quarter 
Forecasts 
Firm-
Quarters 
Distinct 
Firms 
I/B/E/S initial one-quarter ahead earnings forecasts, 
1998 – 2011. 
1,169,236 212,095 11,678 
Retain: earnings forecasts with actual EPS to 
calculate forecast errors. 
1,159,760 208,274 11,444 
Retain: earnings forecasts with unique I/B/E/S 
analyst identifiers. 
1,153,101 207,777 11,432 
Retain: earnings forecasts issued between prior and 
current actual earnings announcement dates. 
919,114 146,528 6,653 
Retain: earnings forecasts for firms with calendar 
fiscal quarters to synchronize GDP and earnings 
forecasts. 
797,857 129,796 6,056 
Retain: earnings forecasts with non-missing 
Compustat financial data to calculate lagged total 
accruals and cyclicality. 
760,910 121,083 5,776 
Retain: earnings forecasts with non-missing CRSP 
price to calculate prior abnormal buy-and-hold 
returns. 
705,544 110,994 5,391 
Retain: earnings forecasts with individual analysts’ 
prior-period forecast errors. 
535,784 105,122 5,326 
Retain: earnings forecasts issued after availability of 
first real GDP growth forecast for quarter t. 
315,962 83,231 5,238 
Primary Sample       315,962 83,231 5,238 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A. Key Variables             
 Negative News Positive News 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median 
FE  185,678 -0.002 0.000 130,284 -0.001 0.000 
NEWS 185,678 -0.024 -0.020 130,284 0.033 0.019 
HORIZON 185,678 75.584 83.000 130,284 74.094 83.000 
FREQ 185,678 1.397 1.000 130,284 1.377 1.000 
NIND 185,678 5.029 4.000 130,284 5.083 4.000 
NFIRM 185,678 12.720 12.000 130,284 12.641 12.000 
FEXP 185,678 8.701 6.000 130,284 8.644 6.000 
LAG_FE  185,678 -0.001 0.000 130,284 0.000 0.000 
BSIZE 185,678 42.187 36.000 130,284 41.231 35.000 
TOP_BROKER 185,678 0.116 0.000 130,284 0.113 0.000 
UW_RANK 185,678 0.479 0.510 130,284 0.477 0.500 
LAG_TACC  185,678 -0.040 -0.025 130,284 -0.037 -0.025 
PRIOR_BHR  185,678 -0.001 -0.009 130,284 -0.002 -0.009 
CYCLICALITY 185,678 0.092 0.033 130,284 0.091 0.032 
MACRO 185,678 0.279 0.000 130,284 0.301 0.000 
EQ_AFFIL 185,678 0.038 0.000 130,284 0.044 0.000 
EQ_OPPORT 185,678 0.064 0.000 130,284 0.053 0.000 
MACRO_ACCURACY 51,934 -1.334 -1.000 39,253 -1.247 -1.000 
MACRO_AWARD 51,934 0.120 0.000 39,253 0.132 0.000 
 
Panel B. Additional Variables for Market Tests 
 Negative News Positive News 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median 
CAR  61,187 -0.002 -0.001 46,208 -0.002 -0.001 
REV  61,187 -0.000 0.000 46,208 -0.000 0.000 
PRIOR_ACC 61,187 -0.005 -0.002 46,208 -0.005 -0.002 
SIZE 61,187 10.757 2.987 46,208 10.797 3.175 
BM 61,187 0.532 0.453 46,208 0.515 0.454 
BETA 61,187 1.124 1.055 46,208 1.146 1.062 
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Table Notes:   
This table presents descriptive statistics for the 1998 to 2011 period. FE = Analyst’s forecast error, calculated as 
actual EPS minus analyst earnings forecast, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the quarter. NEWS = 
Macroeconomic news, defined as the most recent median consensus real GDP growth forecast for the quarter 
minus the actual real GDP growth for the same quarter last year. HORIZON = Analyst’s forecast horizon, defined 
as the days between the analyst's earnings forecast date and the firm’s earnings announcement date for the quarter. 
FREQ = Analyst's forecast frequency, defined as the number of earnings forecasts issued by the analyst for the 
firm during the quarter. NIND = The number of Fama-French 48 industries that the analyst follows during the 
quarter. NFIRM = The number of firms that the analyst follows during the quarter. FEXP = Analyst’s firm-specific 
experience, defined as the number of quarters that the analyst has issued at least one earnings forecast for the firm 
prior to the quarter. LAG_FE = Analyst’s prior-period forecast error, calculated as actual EPS minus analyst’s last 
earnings forecast for the prior quarter, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the prior quarter. BSIZE = 
Investment firm size, calculated as the number of unique analysts employed by the analyst’s investment firm during 
the quarter. TOP_BROKER = An indicator that is set to 1 if the analyst’s investment firm size is within top 10% 
in a given calendar year, and 0 otherwise. UW_RANK = Investment firm’s underwriting rank, measured by the 
percentile rank of total equity underwriting dollar amounts of the analyst’s investment firm in the year prior to the 
analyst's earnings forecast for the firm. LAG_TACC = Lagged total accruals, calculated as the firm’s income 
before extraordinary items minus total cash flow from operations for the prior quarter, scaled by average total 
assets of the prior quarter. PRIOR_BHR = Prior abnormal buy-and-hold return, defined as the size-adjusted 
abnormal buy-and-hold return for the firm within [-90,-2] of the analyst's earnings forecast. CYCLICALITY = 
Earnings sensitivity to GDP news, measured as the R2 from the regression of the firm’s seasonal change in 
quarterly earnings on the corresponding quarterly GDP news over the entire sample period. MACRO = Availability 
of an active in-house macroeconomist, an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the analyst has access to in-house 
macroeconomist’s most recent research, and 0 otherwise. EQ_AFFIL = Equity underwriter-client relationship, an 
indicator variable that is set to 1 if the analyst is employed by the investment firm that acted as the lead manager 
or co-manager of the firm's equity underwriting team in the year prior to the analyst's earnings forecast, and 0 
otherwise. EQ_OPPORT = Equity underwriting opportunity, an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the firm 
announces an equity offering in the year following the analyst's earnings forecast, and 0 otherwise. 
MACRO_ACCURACY = In-house macroeconomist’s forecast accuracy, calculated as an economist’s absolute 
GDP forecast error in the most recent research, scaled by the absolute median consensus GDP forecast error in the 
most recent Bloomberg macroeconomic survey, and then multiplied by (-1). MACRO_AWARD = In-house 
macroeconomist’s All-American Research Team award status, an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the economist 
is ranked in the top three or as a runner-up by Institutional Investor during the year, and 0 otherwise. CAR = Three-
day cumulative size-adjusted abnormal return surrounding the analyst's earnings forecast date. REV = Analyst’s 
forecast revision, calculated as the analyst’s earnings forecast for the firm minus the most recent mean consensus 
analyst forecast (within [-30,-2]), scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the quarter. PRIOR_ACC = Analyst 
prior accuracy, calculated as the average of analyst’s price-deflated absolute forecast errors over the prior four 
quarters multiplied by -1. SIZE = The market value of the firm’s common stock at the beginning of the quarter. 
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BM = Book-to-market ratio of the firm at the beginning of the quarter. BETA = Market beta, defined as the firm's 
market beta in the calendar year preceding the analyst's earnings forecast.  
  
Table 3 
Earnings Sensitivity to Macroeconomic News 
 Earnings Sensitivity to Negative News Earnings Sensitivity to Positive News 
Industry N Mean StDev 25% 50% 75% N Mean StDev 25% 50% 75% 
Consumer nondurables 194 0.081 0.120 0.010 0.035 0.094 188 0.217 0.267 0.020 0.099 0.364 
Consumer durables 87 0.164 0.201 0.036 0.093 0.213 80 0.303 0.284 0.050 0.218 0.461 
Manufacturing 417 0.126 0.168 0.017 0.067 0.172 400 0.171 0.223 0.016 0.079 0.244 
Energy 237 0.103 0.167 0.008 0.032 0.122 233 0.229 0.257 0.030 0.119 0.363 
Chemicals 98 0.116 0.174 0.014 0.047 0.143 95 0.188 0.236 0.023 0.086 0.308 
Business equipment 1,116 0.123 0.201 0.014 0.048 0.133 1,053 0.217 0.266 0.020 0.097 0.339 
Telecom  177 0.103 0.170 0.013 0.046 0.112 165 0.209 0.270 0.011 0.074 0.353 
Utilities 131 0.064 0.143 0.006 0.023 0.060 131 0.119 0.208 0.006 0.030 0.130 
Wholesale, retail, and services 319 0.104 0.162 0.013 0.054 0.132 307 0.229 0.275 0.019 0.124 0.378 
Healthcare 692 0.121 0.201 0.011 0.043 0.129 662 0.207 0.278 0.016 0.073 0.296 
Financial 1,032 0.114 0.184 0.012 0.055 0.136 1,019 0.181 0.235 0.019 0.081 0.264 
Others 643 0.109 0.171 0.010 0.041 0.137 617 0.191 0.241 0.021 0.089 0.276 
Overall 5,143 0.114 0.182 0.012 0.047 0.134 4,950 0.201 0.229 0.023 0.108 0.317 
 
Table Notes:   
This table presents the R2s from estimating the firm-specific OLS regressions of earnings changes on GDP news for all sample firms during the 1998 to 2011 period. Earnings 
changes are seasonally-adjusted changes in quarterly earnings, calculated as income before extraordinary items for quarter t minus income before extraordinary items for 
quarter t-4, scaled by average total assets for quarter t. GDP news is defined as the most recent median consensus real GDP growth forecast for the quarter minus the actual 
real GDP growth for the same quarter last year (i.e., FGDPt - GDPt-4). Industries are based on Fama-French 12 industry classification.   
 
 
  
Table 4  
Analysts' Efficiency in Incorporating Current Macroeconomic News 
 
NEWS = Primary News Measure:  Alternative Current Quarter News Measures: 
 FGDPt - GDPt-4 FGDPt - FGDPt-4 GDPt - GDPt-4 
 Neg News Pos News Neg News Pos News Neg News Pos News 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEP. VAR. = FE FE FE FE FE FE 
INTERCEPT 0.0063*** 0.0103*** 0.0066*** -0.0011 0.0065*** -0.0005 
 (2.95) (3.16) (3.08) (-0.40) (3.29) (-0.13) 
NEWS 0.0731*** -0.0023 0.0763*** -0.0057 0.0747*** 0.0001 
 (3.17) (-0.38) (3.29) (-0.81) (3.62) (0.02) 
Analyst-specific controls:     
HORIZON -0.0012*** -0.0008*** -0.0012*** -0.0008*** -0.0011*** -0.0009*** 
 (-4.75) (-5.68) (-4.70) (-5.43) (-5.13) (-4.71) 
FREQ -0.0018*** -0.0011*** -0.0018*** -0.0011*** -0.0017*** -0.0011*** 
 (-5.54) (-3.73) (-5.37) (-3.72) (-5.54) (-3.48) 
NIND 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (1.12) (0.92) (1.02) (0.88) (1.23) (0.47) 
NFIRM -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000** 
 (-2.55) (-2.36) (-2.54) (-2.58) (-2.68) (-2.06) 
FEXP 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000*** 
 (0.91) (2.01) (0.97) (2.04) (0.77) (3.25) 
LAG_FE 0.2740*** 0.2590*** 0.2750*** 0.2580*** 0.2740*** 0.2600*** 
 (10.40) (8.54) (10.43) (8.45) (10.50) (8.29) 
Broker-specific controls:     
BSIZE 0.0005*** 0.0002** 0.0005*** 0.0002** 0.0005*** 0.0002*** 
 (5.33) (2.53) (5.18) (2.52) (4.93) (2.65) 
TOP_BROKER 0.0002 0.0003** 0.0002 0.0003** 0.0003 0.0003* 
 (1.23) (2.19) (1.14) (2.27) (1.41) (1.88) 
UW_RANK -0.0005*** 0.0000 -0.0005*** 0.0000 -0.0005** -0.0000 
 (-3.09) (0.14) (-3.07) (0.04) (-2.54) (-0.10) 
Firm-specific controls:     
LAG_TACC -0.0040** -0.0026** -0.0041** -0.0026** -0.0042** -0.0021* 
 (-2.29) (-2.10) (-2.25) (-2.06) (-2.54) (-1.93) 
PRIOR_BHR 0.0055*** 0.0050*** 0.0055*** 0.0051*** 0.0056*** 0.0049*** 
 (5.90) (4.98) (5.67) (5.02) (6.14) (4.72) 
CYCLICALITY -0.0036 -0.0009 -0.0037 -0.0008 -0.0035 -0.0008 
 (-1.17) (-0.61) (-1.16) (-0.54) (-1.21) (-0.52) 
Industry FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 185,678 130,284 179,806 128,485 194,937 121,025 
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.065 0.078 0.065 0.077 0.065 
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Table Notes:   
This table presents the results from estimating the OLS regression of Equation (1). FE = Analyst’s forecast error, 
calculated as actual EPS minus analyst earnings forecast, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the quarter. 
NEWS = Macroeconomic news, defined as (1) the most recent median consensus real GDP growth forecast for 
the quarter minus the actual real GDP growth for the same quarter last year (i.e. FGDPt - GDPt-4), (2) the most 
recent median consensus real GDP growth forecast for the quarter minus the final median consensus real GDP 
growth for the same quarter last year (i.e. FGDPt - FGDPt-4), or (3) the actual real GDP growth forecast for the 
quarter minus the actual real GDP growth for the same quarter last year (i.e. GDPt - GDPt-4). HORIZON = 
Analyst’s forecast horizon, defined as the natural logarithm of the days between the analyst's earnings forecast 
date and the firm’s earnings announcement date for the quarter. FREQ = Analyst's forecast frequency, defined as 
the number of earnings forecasts issued by the analyst for the firm during the quarter. NIND = The number of 
Fama-French 48 industries that the analyst follows during the quarter. NFIRM = The number of firms that the 
analyst follows during the quarter. FEXP = Analyst’s firm-specific experience, defined as the number of quarters 
that the analyst has issued at least one earnings forecast for the firm prior to the quarter. LAG_FE = Analyst’s 
prior-period forecast error, calculated as actual EPS minus analyst’s last earnings forecast for the prior quarter, 
scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the prior quarter. BSIZE = Investment firm size, calculated as the 
natural logarithm of the number of unique analysts employed by the analyst’s investment firm during the quarter. 
TOP_BROKER = An indicator that is set to 1 if the analyst’s investment firm size is within top 10% in a given 
calendar year, and 0 otherwise. UW_RANK= Investment firm’s underwriting rank, measured by the percentile 
rank of total equity underwriting dollar amounts of the analyst’s investment firm in the year prior to the analyst's 
earnings forecast for the firm. LAG_TACC = Lagged total accruals, calculated as the firm’s income before 
extraordinary items minus total cash flow from operations for the prior quarter, scaled by average total assets of 
the prior quarter. PRIOR_BHR = Prior abnormal buy-and-hold return, defined as the size-adjusted abnormal buy-
and-hold return for the firm within [-90,-2] of the analyst's earnings forecast. CYCLICALITY = Earnings 
sensitivity to GDP news, measured as the R2 from the regression of the firm’s seasonal change in quarterly 
earnings on the corresponding quarterly GDP news over the entire sample period. Analyst earnings forecasts are 
classified into negative macroeconomic news or positive macroeconomic news samples based on the sign of 
NEWS. For the dependent variable, FE, a negative (positive) value indicates analyst optimism (pessimism); for 
the independent variable NEWS, a positive (negative) coefficient estimate indicates analyst under-reaction 
(overreaction). Two-tailed t-statistics (in parenthesis) are calculated using two-way clustered standard errors, 
clustered by firm and quarter. *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5 
In-House Macroeconomist with a Current GDP Forecast and Analysts’ Efficiency in  
Incorporating Negative Macroeconomic News 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 Negative News 
 MACRO = 0 MACRO = 1 t-test 
Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median t-stats z-stats 
FE  -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 *** *** 
HORIZON 75.478 83.000 75.854 83.000 *** *** 
FREQ 1.377 1.000 1.447 1.000 *** *** 
NIND 5.031 4.000 5.024 4.000 n.s. ** 
NFIRM 12.282 11.000 13.848 13.000 *** *** 
FEXP 8.380 6.000 9.529 7.000 *** *** 
LAG_FE  -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 *** *** 
BSIZE 29.968 24.000 73.655 77.000 *** *** 
TOP_BROKER 0.046 0.000 0.297 0.000 *** *** 
UW_RANK 0.368 0.380 0.767 0.830 *** *** 
N 133,744  51,934    
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Panel B. Empirical Tests 
 Negative News 
  
Firm-quarter 
relative FE 
measure: 
Only 
consistent 
macro- 
forecasters: 
Placebo 
test: 
NEWS = 
LAG_TACC 
Natural experiments: 
Control for 
inactive 
macro- 
forecasters: 
Control for 
broker 
resource 
interactions: 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Full sample 
Firms with  
Nanalyst > 5 
Over prior  
4 quarters 
Full sample 
Analyst 
change 
Economist 
change 
Full sample Full sample 
DEP. VAR. = FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
INTERCEPT 0.0064*** 0.0001 0.0049** 0.0064*** 0.0028 0.0034 0.0071*** 0.0065*** 
 (2.96) (1.53) (2.19) (2.76) (0.56) (0.76) (3.38) (2.79) 
NEWS 0.0772*** 0.0012* 0.0779*** 0.0037** 0.0921** 0.0618*** 0.0843*** 0.0833** 
 (3.40) (1.84) (3.37) (2.15) (2.06) (3.71) (4.28) (2.53) 
MACRO -0.0003 -0.0002*** -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0003* -0.0004*** 
 (-1.62) (-2.79) (-1.46) (1.23) (-0.84) (-1.46) (-1.90) (-2.88) 
MACRO * NEWS -0.0117** -0.0022** -0.0107** 0.0200 -0.0981* -0.0654** -0.0119** -0.0169*** 
 (-2.07) (-2.24) (-2.04) (1.17) (-1.71) (-1.98) (-2.03) (-3.30) 
EQ_AFFIL 0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0005 0.0009 -0.0010 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.26) (2.67) (0.19) (1.00) (0.21) (-1.02) (0.26) (0.11) 
EQ_AFFIL * NEWS -0.0050 0.0038 -0.0051 0.0144 0.0959 -0.0119 -0.0044 -0.0079 
 (-0.30) (1.21) (-0.30) (0.93) (0.33) (-0.12) (-0.28) (-0.48) 
EQ_OPPORT 0.0003 NA 0.0002 0.0009 -0.0016 0.0043** 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.57)  (0.49) (1.33) (-0.38) (2.07) (0.49) (0.56) 
EQ_OPPORT * NEWS -0.0070 NA -0.0068 0.0196 0.0605 0.1568** -0.0075 -0.0072 
 (-0.79)  (-0.76) (0.88) (0.61) (2.30) (-0.81) (-0.82) 
INACTIVE       -0.0002  
       (-1.29)  
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INACTIVE * NEWS       0.0002  
       (0.05)  
BSIZE * NEWS        -0.0054 
        (-1.39) 
TOP_BROKER * NEWS        -0.0077 
        (-0.74) 
UW_RANK * NEWS        0.0301*** 
        (3.39) 
Analyst-specific controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Broker-specific controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm-specific controls Included Not Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Not Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Not Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 185,678 108,797 179,021 185,678 1,604 2,362 185,678 185,678 
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.036 0.079 0.076 0.069 0.030 0.078 0.078 
 
Table Notes:   
This table presents the results from estimating the OLS regression of Equation (2) for the negative macroeconomic news sample. FE = Analyst’s forecast error, calculated as 
actual EPS minus analyst earnings forecast, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the quarter. NEWS = Macroeconomic news, defined as the most recent median 
consensus real GDP growth forecast for the quarter minus the actual real GDP growth for the same quarter last year. MACRO = Availability of an active in-house 
macroeconomist, an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the analyst has access to in-house macroeconomist’s most recent research, and 0 otherwise. EQ_AFFIL = Equity 
underwriter-client relationship, an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the analyst is employed by the investment firm that acted as the lead manager or co-manager of the firm's 
equity underwriting team in the year prior to the analyst's earnings forecast, and 0 otherwise. EQ_OPPORT = Equity underwriting opportunity, an indicator variable that is set 
to 1 if the firm announces an equity offering in the year following the analyst's earnings forecast, and 0 otherwise. INACTIVE = Inactive in-house macroeconomist, an indicator 
variable that is set to 1 if the brokerage firm has an active in-house macroeconomist in the past but not for the current quarter, and 0 otherwise. Analyst-specific controls 
(HORIZON, FREQ, NIND, NFIRM, FEXP, and LAG_FE), broker-specific controls (BSIZE, TOP_BROKER, and UW_RANK), and firm-specific controls (LAG_TACC, 
PRIOR_BHR, and CYCLICALITY) are as previously defined. For the dependent variable, FE, a negative (positive) value indicates analyst optimism (pessimism); for the 
independent variable NEWS, a positive (negative) coefficient estimate indicates analyst under-reaction (overreaction). In Column 2, the FE dependent variable and the analyst 
and broker independent variables are mean-adjusted by firm-quarter. Two-tailed t-statistics (in parenthesis) are calculated using two-way clustered standard errors, clustered by 
firm and quarter. *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
In-House Macroeconomist with a Current GDP Forecast and Analysts’ Efficiency in  
Incorporating Negative Macroeconomic News: Cyclicality and Firm Size Partitions 
 
 Negative News 
 
Low cyclicality 
(among all firms) 
High cyclicality 
(among all firms) 
Low cyclicality 
(within industry) 
High cyclicality 
(within industry) 
Large firms Small firms   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEP. VAR. = FE FE FE FE FE FE 
INTERCEPT 0.0092** 0.0040* 0.0078* 0.0043 0.0046*** 0.0068* 
 (2.52) (1.71) (1.91) (1.64) (2.84) (1.75) 
NEWS 0.0269*** 0.1279*** 0.0324*** 0.1227*** 0.0509*** 0.0965*** 
 (2.96) (3.44) (2.81) (3.52) (3.59) (3.32) 
MACRO 0.0000 -0.0005** 0.0000 -0.0005** -0.0001 -0.0009*** 
 (0.19) (-2.52) (0.12) (-2.41) (-0.78) (-2.61) 
MACRO * NEWS -0.0070 -0.0153** -0.0068 -0.0157** 0.0001 -0.0225** 
 (-1.13) (-2.20) (-1.27) (-2.50) (0.05) (-2.28) 
EQ_AFFIL -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0000 0.0004 
 (-0.44) (0.74) (-0.54) (0.85) (-0.07) (0.52) 
EQ_AFFIL * NEWS 0.0018 -0.0141 -0.0025 -0.0111 -0.0004 -0.0123 
 (0.05) (-0.62) (-0.07) (-0.52) (-0.03) (-0.41) 
EQ_OPPORT 0.0009* -0.0004 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 
 (1.95) (-0.66) (1.20) (-0.14) (0.12) (0.45) 
EQ_OPPORT * NEWS -0.0076 -0.0099 -0.0034 -0.0126 0.0440 -0.0425** 
 (-0.86) (-0.63) (-0.73) (-1.06) (1.32) (-2.25) 
Analyst-specific controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Broker-specific controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm-specific controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
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Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 92,643 93,035 93,135 92,543 91,570 93,711 
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.094 0.059 0.098 0.110 0.076 
 
Table Notes:   
This table presents the results from estimating the OLS regression of Equation (2) for the negative macroeconomic news sample, conditional on high/low cyclicality or firm 
size, where cyclicality is measured as the R2 from the regression of the firm’s seasonal change in quarterly earnings on the corresponding quarterly GDP news over the entire 
sample period and firm size is measured as the market value of the firm’s common stock at the beginning of the quarter. FE = Analyst’s forecast error, calculated as actual EPS 
minus analyst earnings forecast, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the quarter. NEWS = Macroeconomic news, defined as the most recent median consensus real 
GDP growth forecast for the quarter minus the actual real GDP growth for the same quarter last year. MACRO = Availability of an active in-house macroeconomist, an indicator 
variable that is set to 1 if the analyst has access to in-house macroeconomist’s most recent research, and 0 otherwise. EQ_AFFIL = Equity underwriter-client relationship, an 
indicator variable that is set to 1 if the analyst is employed by the investment firm that acted as the lead manager or co-manager of the firm's equity underwriting team in the 
year prior to the analyst's earnings forecast, and 0 otherwise. EQ_OPPORT = Equity underwriting opportunity, an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the firm announces an 
equity offering in the year following the analyst's earnings forecast, and 0 otherwise. Analyst-specific controls (HORIZON, FREQ, NIND, NFIRM, FEXP, and LAG_FE), 
broker-specific controls (BSIZE, TOP_BROKER, and UW_RANK), and firm-specific controls (LAG_TACC, PRIOR_BHR, and CYCLICALITY) are as previously defined. 
For the dependent variable, FE, a negative (positive) value indicates analyst optimism (pessimism); for the independent variable NEWS, a positive (negative) coefficient 
estimate indicates analyst under-reaction (overreaction). Two-tailed t-statistics (in parenthesis) are calculated using two-way clustered standard errors, clustered by firm and 
quarter. *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
All In-House Macroeconomists with a Current GDP Forecast: 
Economist Factors Affecting Efficiency in Incorporating Negative Macroeconomic News 
 
 Negative News (MACRO = 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
DEP. VAR. = FE FE FE 
INTERCEPT 0.0273*** 0.0279*** 0.0278*** 
 (10.52) (10.80) (10.92) 
NEWS 0.0576*** 0.0744*** 0.0610*** 
 (2.66) (3.24) (2.83) 
MACRO_ACCURACY -0.0001  -0.0001 
 (-0.71)  (-0.70) 
MACRO_ACCURACY * NEWS -0.0091**  -0.0086** 
 (-2.36)  (-2.26) 
MACRO_AWARD  -0.0004 -0.0004 
  (-1.00) (-0.96) 
MACRO_AWARD * NEWS  -0.0212*** -0.0190*** 
  (-2.73) (-2.70) 
EQ_AFFIL 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.46) (0.41) (0.43) 
EQ_AFFIL * NEWS -0.0057 -0.0070 -0.0063 
 (-0.29) (-0.35) (-0.32) 
EQ_OPPORT 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (1.06) (1.09) (1.07) 
EQ_OPPORT * NEWS -0.0074 -0.0067 -0.0074 
 (-1.37) (-1.12) (-1.39) 
    
Analyst-specific controls Included Included Included 
Broker-specific controls Included Included Included 
Firm-specific controls Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Observations 51,934 51,934 51,934 
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.083 0.083 
 
Table Notes:   
This table presents the results from estimating the OLS regression of Equation (3) for the negative macroeconomic 
news sample. FE = Analyst’s forecast error, calculated as actual EPS minus analyst earnings forecast, scaled by 
the stock price at the beginning of the quarter. NEWS = Macroeconomic news, defined as the most recent median 
consensus real GDP growth forecast for the quarter minus the actual real GDP growth for the same quarter last 
year. MACRO_ACCURACY = In-house macroeconomist’s forecast accuracy, calculated as an economist’s 
absolute GDP forecast error in the most recent research, scaled by the absolute median consensus GDP forecast 
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error in the most recent Bloomberg macroeconomic survey, and then multiplied by (-1). MACRO_AWARD = In-
house macroeconomist’s All-American Research Team award status, an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the 
economist is ranked in the top three or as a runner-up by Institutional Investor during the year, and 0 otherwise. 
EQ_AFFIL = Equity underwriter-client relationship, an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the analyst is employed 
by the investment firm that acted as the lead manager or co-manager of the firm's equity underwriting team in the 
year prior to the analyst's earnings forecast, and 0 otherwise. EQ_OPPORT = Equity underwriting opportunity, an 
indicator variable that is set to 1 if the firm announces an equity offering in the year following the analyst's earnings 
forecast, and 0 otherwise. Analyst-specific controls (HORIZON, FREQ, NIND, NFIRM, FEXP, and LAG_FE), 
broker-specific controls (BSIZE, TOP_BROKER, and UW_RANK), and firm-specific controls (LAG_TACC, 
PRIOR_BHR, and CYCLICALITY) are as previously defined. For the dependent variable, FE, a negative 
(positive) value indicates analyst optimism (pessimism); for the independent variable NEWS, a positive (negative) 
coefficient estimate indicates analyst under-reaction (overreaction). Two-tailed t-statistics (in parenthesis) are 
calculated using two-way clustered standard errors, clustered by firm and quarter. *, **, ***, indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Market Credibility of Analysts’ Earnings Research  
 
 Negative News 
 (1) =  (2) =  (3) =  (4) =  
 
All forecasts 
from primary 
sample 
(1), excluding 
forecasts within 
EA window 
(1), excluding 
forecasts within 
MG window 
(1), excluding 
forecasts within 
EA or MG 
window 
DEP. VAR. =   CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] 
INTERCEPT -0.0417*** -0.0427*** -0.0367*** -0.0374*** 
 (-3.96) (-4.04) (-3.49) (-3.55) 
REV 4.5916*** 4.6707*** 2.4069*** 2.4464*** 
 (6.10) (6.14) (3.57) (3.58) 
MACRO -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0009 
 (-0.57) (-0.55) (-1.27) (-1.27) 
MACRO * REV 0.5953*** 0.5941*** 0.4734** 0.4742** 
 (2.85) (2.84) (2.40) (2.40) 
PRIOR_ACC 0.0752** 0.0748** 0.0689** 0.0686** 
 (2.29) (2.28) (2.10) (2.09) 
PRIOR_ACC * REV 4.9871*** 4.9878*** 3.9540*** 3.9558*** 
 (2.97) (2.97) (2.62) (2.62) 
SIZE 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 
 (1.15) (1.15) (0.57) (0.57) 
SIZE * REV -0.1537*** -0.1551*** -0.1076** -0.1086** 
 (-2.87) (-2.88) (-2.25) (-2.26) 
BM 0.0048*** 0.0050*** 0.0049*** 0.0050*** 
 (2.84) (2.92) (2.90) (2.95) 
BM * REV -0.5306*** -0.5366*** -0.4057*** -0.4102*** 
 (-4.56) (-4.61) (-3.67) (-3.71) 
BETA -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 
 (-0.34) (-0.37) (0.32) (0.28) 
BETA * REV 0.1325 0.1332 0.1651 0.1660 
 (1.01) (1.02) (1.42) (1.43) 
     
Analyst-specific controls Included Included Included Included 
Broker-specific controls Included Included Included Included 
Firm-specific controls Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Observations 61,187 60,794 58,974 58,710 
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.029 0.021 0.022 
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Table Notes:   
This table presents the results from estimating the OLS regression of Equation (4) for the negative 
macroeconomic news sample. CAR = Three-day cumulative size-adjusted abnormal return surrounding the 
analyst's earnings forecast date. REV = Analyst’s forecast revision, calculated as the analyst’s earnings forecast 
for the firm minus the most recent mean consensus analyst forecast (within [-30,-2]), scaled by the stock price at 
the beginning of the quarter. MACRO = Availability of an active in-house macroeconomist, an indicator variable 
that is set to 1 if the analyst has access to in-house macroeconomist’s most recent research, and 0 otherwise. 
PRIOR_ACC = Analyst prior accuracy, calculated as the average of the analyst’s price-deflated absolute forecast 
errors over the prior four quarters multiplied by -1, so that the variable is increasing in accuracy. SIZE = The 
natural logarithm of the market value of the firm’s common stock at the beginning of the quarter. BM = Book-
to-market ratio of the firm at the beginning of the quarter. BETA = Market beta, defined as the firm's market beta 
in the calendar year preceding the analyst's earnings forecast. Analyst-specific controls (HORIZON, FREQ, 
NIND, NFIRM, FEXP, and LAG_FE), broker-specific controls (BSIZE, TOP_BROKER, and UW_RANK), and 
firm-specific controls (LAG_TACC, PRIOR_BHR, and CYCLICALITY) are as previously defined. Two-tailed 
t-statistics (in parenthesis) are calculated using two-way clustered standard errors, clustered by firm and day. *, 
**, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
